OPINION BY Senior Judge QUIGLEY.
Stacey MacNeal, Esquire, appeals from the April 5, 2010 order of the Court of Common Pleas of York County (trial court) reversing a decision of the Office of Open Records (OOR) requiring York Township to obtain certain records from York Township Commissioner Kenneth M. Silberstein stored on his personal computer and provide them to MacNeal pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law (RTKL).
On June 10, 2009, MacNeal requested that York Township provide: (1) Any and all electronic communications or written correspondence from Charter Homes or its representatives or legal counsel, including Charles Courtney of McNees, Wallace & Nurick to York Township or the York Township Board of Commissioners from January 1, 2009 to date; (2) Any and all electronic communications or written correspondence between Commissioner Ness and/or Commissioner Silberstein and citizens of [York] Township, including but not limited to John Bowders, in reference to Charter Homes, the TND Application known as Stonebridge, . . . from January 1, 2008 to date; (3) Any and all electronic communications or written correspondence between Commissioner Silberstein and any legal counsel other than [York] Township Solicitor regarding Charter Homes, the TND Application known as Stonebridge,. . . from January 1, 2008 to present. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 3a-4a.
On July 14, 2009, York Township, by its Open Records Officer, produced only documents/emails that were on computers under the possession and control of the township. R.R. at 6a-7a. York Township did not produce any documents/emails that were specifically on computers that were solely maintained by Commissioner Ness and/or Commissioner Silberstein and/or businesses for which they own or are employed. Id. York Township did not consider electronic communications between one individual Commissioner and a citizen or citizens of York Township public records as defined under the RTKL. Id. Therefore, York Township did not provide any such electronic communications or written correspondence. Id. York Township also refused to provide any electronic communications or written correspondence between Commissioner Silberstein and any legal counsel other than York Township Solicitor as not being public records and protected by the attorney client privilege. Id.
On July 22, 2009, the OOR received a timely appeal filed by MacNeal. R.R. at 97a-104a. The OOR did not hold a hearing; however, the OOR invited the parties to submit information and Commissioner Silberstein, Commissioner Ness and York Township filed documents and correspondence in response to MacNeal's appeal. Id. at 105a-157a. The OOR also accepted MacNeal's responses to said submissions and correspondence. Id.
On September 21, 2009, Silberstein appealed the OOR's final determination to the trial court.
The trial court determined that MacNeal had the burden of proving that the records she requested on Silberstein's personal computer are "public records." Id. The trial court held that the OOR erred in finding that the records maintained on Silberstein's personal computer were public records because they were records of a public officer and therefore within the control of the agency. Id. The trial court pointed out that the plain language of the RTKL does not support such a finding because Silberstein is not a governmental entity. Id. The trial court determined that Silberstein has no authority to act alone on behalf of York Township, nor does he have any obligation to keep records of, let alone disclose to the public, every conversation, note, email, or telephone call in which he discusses matters pertaining to York Township. Id. As such, the trial court found that MacNeal failed to sustain her burden.
Herein, MacNeal raises the following issues: (1) Whether an elected official may shield public records relating to York Township activity from public access by conducting York Township affairs from a third-party email address on a personal computer; and (2) Whether the requestor seeking records pursuant to the RTKL bears the burden of establishing that the requested records constitute a "public record."
This is a case of first impression under the new RTKL
Section 102 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.102. Thus, there is no dispute that York Township is a local agency subject to the RTKL and, as such, required to disclose public records. Section 302 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.302.
The RTKL defines a "record" as "[i]nformation, regardless of physical form or characteristics, that documents a transaction or activity of an agency and that is created, received or retained pursuant to law or in connection with a transaction, business or activity of the agency."
Herein, a review of MacNeal's request reveals that the request, on its face, seeks information that documents activity of York Township through its Commissioners in connection with the business of York Township, i.e., certain applications for development projects in York Township. See R.R. at 3a-4a. York Township denied MacNeal's request for any emails or written correspondence contained on any computers that were solely maintained by Commissioner Silberstein because said records were not under the possession and control of York Township. York Township also did not consider electronic communications between one individual Commissioner and a citizen or citizens of York Township public records as defined under the RTKL.
The initial question that must be addressed is whether emails or documents on Commissioner Silberstein's personal computer are public records. As argued by both Commissioner Silberstein and The Pennsylvania School Boards Association, a distinction must be made between transactions or activities of an agency which may be a "public record" under the RTKL and the emails or documents of an individual public office holder. As pointed out by the trial court, Commissioner Silberstein is not a governmental entity. He is an individual public official with no authority to act alone on behalf of the Township.
Consequently, emails and documents found on Commissioner Silberstein's personal computer would not fall within the definition of record as any record personally and individually created by Commissioner Silberstein would not be a documentation of a transaction or activity of York Township, as the local agency, nor would the record have been created, received or retained pursuant to law or in connection with a transaction, business or activity of York Township. In other words, unless the emails and other documents in Commissioner Silberstein's possession were produced with the authority of York Township, as a local agency, or were later ratified, adopted or confirmed by York Township, said requested records cannot be deemed "public records" within the meaning of the RTKL as the same are not "of the local agency".
Moreover, the current RTKL has a procedure in place that puts the burden upon a local agency, through its designated open-records officer, to first make a good faith determination as to whether any requested record is in fact a "public record" and, if so, then determine whether the identified public record is within its possession, custody or control. Sections 502 and 901 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. §§ 67.502; 67.901. In making such a good faith determination of whether a requested record is a public record, the open-records officer is required, inter alia, to direct requests to other appropriate persons within the agency. Section 502 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.502. Therefore, this Court believes that a right-to-know request directed to a local agency, such as York Township in this case, requires that the local agency's open-records officer inquire of its public officials, such as Commissioner Silberstein in this case, as to whether the public official is in possession, custody or control of a requested record that could be deemed
In other words, the current RTKL has effectively put forth safeguards to protect against the possibility that an agency may attempt to shield public records from disclosure by simply storing the records on a computer that is not in the physical possession or control of the agency.
The trial court's order is affirmed in accordance with the foregoing opinion.
AND NOW, this 6th day of January, 2011, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of York County entered in the above-captioned matter is affirmed in accordance with the foregoing opinion.